It is possible that human capital produces positive externalities to the society indirectly, through non-market channels such as health or crime. Another such channel could be the effect of education on the functioning of democratic decision-making. Measures of the functioning of democracy are bound to be controversial, but one such measure -voter turnout -reflects the engagement of people to democracy, and also receives a considerable amount of attention from social scientists as well as the media.
It is possible that human capital produces positive externalities to the society indirectly, through non-market channels such as health or crime. Another such channel could be the effect of education on the functioning of democratic decision-making. Measures of the functioning of democracy are bound to be controversial, but one such measure -voter turnout -reflects the engagement of people to democracy, and also receives a considerable amount of attention from social scientists as well as the media.
A vast body of empirical research supports the conclusion that educated people have a higher tendency to vote in political elections. However, since the level of education is not assigned randomly, but is a conscious choice, the possibility remains that both education and political participation are determined by unobserved personal qualities or parental influences. So far few studies have been able to find and utilise an institutional change that would have produced experimental variation in the amount of schooling across individuals or groups of people and match it to data on voter turnout or other variables of civic engagement. The few recent studies that attempt this, end up with partly conflicting results.
This study estimates the effect of education on voter turnout in the long run. It contributes to the empirical evidence based on institutional changes by using the timing of a Norwegian staged school reform as an instrumental variable for education. In contrast to previous studies, the Norwegian reform created relatively large individual level variation in the years of schooling at lower levels of attainment, as the minimum number of compulsory years was raised from seven to nine. The timing of the reform varied across Norway in a scattered fashion, and this variation appears to be quasirandom as it is difficult to find socio-economic correlates for it.
To provide a robust view of the effects of the reform, the analysis is carried out at two levels.
Firstly, by using survey data, the impact of the reform on voting in parliamentary elections is tested using individual level data two to four decades after the reform. To the extent that the survey responses can be trusted, this provides an ideal setting for the evaluation of the impact of education on voting. Since some assumptions regarding accuracy of the survey data cannot be fully tested, the analysis is also carried out at the municipality level, using data from up to two decades after the Introduction Empirical search for human capital externalities has not been fruitful, prompting recent surveyors to conclude that empirical evidence for important human capital externalities is "at best, weak" (Lange and Topel, 2006) . Such externalities typically refer to direct, productivity increasing externalities, often labelled "technological externalities". However, it may be that human capital produces positive externalities to the society indirectly, through non-market channels such as health, crime or via different inter-generational channels (Wolfe and Zuvekas, 1997) . Another such channel could be the effect of education on the functioning of democratic decision-making (Hanushek, 2002 , Milligan et al., 2004 . For instance, if education raises voter turnout or the awareness of the electorate in terms of economic and social issues, one could expect the quality of democratic decision-making process to improve in the long run. While empirical work has not found significant connections between democracy and economic growth (Haan and Siermann 1995, Barro 1996) , the impact of the quality of the democratic decision making process on economic performance remains largely an unexplored area.
Voter turnout is far from a perfect measure of the quality of the democratic process. Larger voter turnout legitimises democracy and political outcomes, but it could also be argued that if voters differ in terms of their ability to make good choices, a lower turnout could even lead to better outcomes if the average voter is more informed.
1 Still, voter turnout is a measure, which receives a considerable amount of attention from social scientists as well as the media, as it reflects the engagement of people to democracy.
It is not obvious why additional education would make a person more likely to vote. The central questions are, what motivates people to vote in the first place despite non-trivial costs, and how could education affect these mechanisms? A recent survey of theories of voter turnout by Dhillon and Peralta (2002) categorise the potential objectives of voters as either instrumental, or expressive.
In the instrumental models, the voters want to affect the outcome of the election and weigh their costs and benefits in deciding about whether to vote or not. The expressive motives have to do with attaining some type of psychological utility from the act of voting (Schuessler 2000) .
In instrumental models, factors that can affect the costs of voting can be such as weather or distance to a polling station, but importantly, also the time needed to gather information about candidates, their policies, and how their policies might affect the voter. Pesendorfer (1996, 1999) note that if education provides people with better access to information, the costs of voting will be lower, and one should expect higher turnout among educated people.
The instrumental motives are not entirely satisfactory, since the costs of voting are practically always larger than the expected marginal benefits at the individual level. As Dhillon and Peralta (2002) conclude: "All models seem agreed that some expressive factor is causing the relatively high levels of turnout". One potential reason for expressive voting, social pressure, is explored by Funk (2007) . She finds that introduction of postal voting reduced voter turnout in small Swiss communities. Her explanation for the reduction in turnout is that voters have gained "a credible excuse" for not appearing on the polling stations on the day of election. Whether education contributes to such expressive motives, is unknown.
A vast body of empirical research supports the conclusion that educated people have a higher tendency to vote in political elections (eg. Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, Helliwell and Putnam 1999 ). However, since the level of education is not assigned randomly, but is a conscious choice, the possibility remains that both education and political participation are determined by unobserved personal qualities or parental influences (Luskin 1990 , Denny and Doyle 2008 , Fowler and Daves 2008 .
So far few studies have been able to find and utilise an institutional change that would have produced experimental variation in the amount of schooling across individuals or groups of people and match it to data on voter turnout or other variables of civic engagement. The few recent studies that attempt this, end up with partly conflicting results.
A study on voter turnout in the United States and United Kingdom by Milligan, Moretti and Oreopoulos (2004) uses the variation in compulsory schooling laws and state-level child labour laws as a source of identification. The differences in these laws produce marginally higher probabilities of school completion across different segments of the population. Their results suggest that in the UK, there is no causal relationship between education and voter turnout, and that in the US, being a high school graduate has an impact on the likelihood of voting 2 . A similar study by Dee (2003) measures the effect of college attendance on voter turnout and utilises the proximity of twoyear colleges as a teen to infer the causal effect of education. As argued by Dee, and earlier by Card (1995) , the proximity of colleges reduces the costs of college attendance. However, the extent to which unobservable characteristics of households are correlated with the proximity of two-year colleges remains unknown, undermining the identification strategy.
Both of the above studies suggest that in the US, schooling has a positive causal effect of voter turnout. As emphasised by Milligan et al. (2004) , the effect may be due to the US procedure of voter registration, which can pose an obstacle for voting for less educated people. This view is supported by their result that in the UK where registration is simpler, education does not affect voter turnout.
A study by Siedler (2009) This study estimates the effect of education on voter turnout in the long run. It contributes to the empirical evidence based on institutional changes by using the timing of a Norwegian staged school reform as an instrumental variable for education. In contrast to previous studies, the Norwegian reform created relatively large individual level variation in the years of schooling at lower levels of attainment, as the minimum number of compulsory years was raised from seven to nine. As demonstrated in the next Section, the timing of the reform varied across Norway in a scattered fashion, and that this variation appears to be quasi-random in a sense that it is difficult to find socioeconomic correlates for it. This makes the Norwegian reform arguably the most convincing compulsory schooling reform available to social scientist.
To provide a robust view of the effects of the reform, which was initiated in 1959, the analysis is carried out at two levels. Firstly, by using survey data, the impact of the reform on voting in parliamentary elections is tested using individual level data from 1977 to 1993, or two to four decades after the reform. To the extent that the survey responses can be trusted, this provides an ideal setting for the evaluation of the impact of education on voting. Since some assumptions regarding accuracy of the survey data cannot be fully tested, the analysis is also carried out at the municipality level, using data from 1960 to 1980, up to two decades after the reform started.
Municipality level turnout data is representative and accurately measured and also caters for potential behavioural externalities in voting behaviour. If political activity of individuals is affected by the activity of their friends and acquaintances, individual level analysis of education and voting would produce biased results. Secondly, the municipality level analysis gathers for potential behavioural changes of those voters whose educational attainment was not affected by the reform.
The results of the study are, at both levels of analysis, that education does not affect voter turnout.
Further, using survey data, the causal impact of education on several measures of civic activity is estimated. Again, all effects are found to be non-significant, except for the likelihood of signing a petition.
The outline of the study is as follows. Section 2 introduces the school reform, and Section 3 briefly describes the data sources. Further details of the data are presented as required, and are mostly located in tables and appendices. Section 4 presents the individual level analysis and Section 5 the municipality level analysis. Conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
The School Reform
The Norwegian compulsory school reform is similar to many reforms carried out in European countries over the latter half of the 20 th century (Leschinsky and Mayer 1990, Viarengo 2007) . Its goal was to increase educational attainment, but also to unify education at the expense of tracking and reduce regional disparities in educational attainment in Norway. The pre-reform system consisted of seven mandatory years of primary education. In addition, some municipalities provided a possibility to continue primary school for one or two years. Secondary education was either a three or a five-year track of general education preparing for academic education. Further, a vocationally oriented schooling was available, typically lasting one or two years. The post-reform system increased the years of compulsory education to nine, and provided an academically oriented 3-year high school with an expanded intake, or a vocational schooling. The curriculum for the two added years in the post-reform system would concentrate on general education. As in other countries with similar reforms, the curricular changes reflected the increased demand for skilled workers (Lie 1973) .
The reform was launched as an experiment in six municipalities, chosen by the Ministry of Education, until it was made compulsory by the central government. Once the reform was legislated in 1959, the municipalities were required to implement the reform by the end of 1972, but were given the liberty to decide the precise timing by themselves. Prior to implementation, local governments were required to present a plan to the central government regarding needs for new teachers, buildings and other costs, which were to be covered by the central government. Due to this process, the timing of the reform across municipalities was partly determined by an interaction process between the central government and the municipalities. Aakvik, Salvenes and Vaage (2003) also mention that individual school directors may have been influential in the timing of the reform within municipalities. The reforms were implemented from 1960 onwards, and the cohorts that were differentially affected by the reform depending on their place of birth, were born over 1946 to 1961.
In 1960, when the reform started, Norway consisted of 732 municipalities, 665 for which the year of reform is known, or can be plausibly estimated, based on the work by Ness (1971) , Aakvik, Salvanes and Vaage (2003) and Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2005) . For the remaining 67 municipalities the reform was either staged over several years or it is unclear when the reform took place.
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Instrumental variable estimation (IV) is an econometric technique that provides a general solution to the problem of endogenous explanatory variables. In the literature on the effects of education on various outcomes of interest, it is generally acknowledged that education is an endogenous variable because unobservable characteristics of individuals can be correlated with their education.
To use the school reform as an instrumental variable, it should satisfy two conditions. Firstly, the reform should increase the level of education for the individual, or the group of interest, and secondly, the reform should affect the outcome variable of interest only via this increase in the level of education. In terms of the first condition, the reform, by imposing the new minimum of nine years of schooling, clearly increases the years of education for those who in the absence of the reform would have attained less than nine years. In terms of the second condition, the critical question to ask is whether those who went through the reformed school system are, in some respects, different than those who went through the old system? In particular, in birth cohorts 1946-1961, pupils ended up to the different schooling systems based on their municipality of residence.
But can it be the case that the municipalities that were early reformers, were in some respects fundamentally different? If this is the case, the second condition will not be satisfied (Wooldridge, 2002: Ch. 5 ).
Early investigation by Lie (1973) finds no obvious geographical or socio-economic correlates of the timing of the reform across municipalities. Her only statistically significant findings were that in a sub-sample of rural municipalities, politically left-leaning and demographically young municipalities implemented the reform earlier than others. Secondly, she noted that municipalities were more likely to reform quickly, if their neighbouring municipalities reformed early. Table 1 presents the results of a municipality-level cross-sectional OLS estimation, in which various municipal socio-economic and political characteristics are used to predict the timing of the reform. The dependent variable is the birth year of the first reformed cohort, and the explanatory variables are as listed in the Table. Only the log mean income of the municipality is near to being significant at 95% level in explaining the timing of the reform. Adding regional controls for the 19
Norwegian counties would not make alter the statistical significance of the variables. It is also worth noting the low proportion of the variance attributable to the regressors. Similar exercise was carried out by Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2005) , albeit with fewer variables depicting political characteristics of the municipalities.
These results suggest that there are no important socio-economic variables that would have predicted the timing of the reform across municipalities in Norway. As such, the reform provides an interesting case of "natural experiment", in which individuals have been subjected to an institutional reform in a fashion that appears random. This provides an interesting opportunity to evaluate the effects of education on individual or collective outcomes in Norway. Data
The data source on individual voters is the Norwegian Election Study. This is a rotating panel Table 2 . Only parliamentary elections are analysed, since the survey data is confined to these.
In practice, the reform increased the number of years only for those individuals who would not have continued schooling beyond 7 or 8 years under the old school system. In what follows, the "treatment group" is assumed to be the individuals who went through the new school system, but did not continue beyond 9 years, the new minimum. The "control group" is defined as the people under the old school system, who ended up attaining 7-9 years of schooling. It is thus assumed that had the reform not taken place, the "treatment group" would have received 7-9 years of schooling in the old system, and that once treated, they would have attained only the new minimum of nine years, and not continued beyond this.
The assumptions are not implausible, since the reform mainly focused on raising minimum attainment. It is still possible that once low attainment individuals are pushed to higher attainment by the reform, they continue to study. If this was the case, the control group would lose some -most likely a non-random set -of its members.
Survey data can hold some caveats. Firstly, it is possible that since we assign treatment status to individuals based on their reported education (see the Appendix 1), it is possible that the treatment status is mismeasured. The individuals who attended attained no further general or vocational education report belonging to any of the four categories: "7 years", "7+1 years", "7+2 years" or "9
years". The first three refer to the pre-reform system and the last one to the reformed system. In the second and third category, "7+1" and "7+2", the additional years of education refer to voluntary continuation school, available in some municipalities prior to the reform. As expected, over the cohorts 1946-1961 we see in Table A1 a steadily declining proportion of people reporting to have been in the pre-reform system.
A second possible problem is misreporting of voting. It is acknowledged that respondents may lie about voting, which is valued as a "social responsibility". The individual level data suggests a turnout rate of 82% (Table 2) , which is in line with turnout rates in Norway during the same Table 5. system one attends is not a choice, but simply a function of the municipality one lives in, this seems unlikely. While the treated individuals did receive on average almost one year more schooling than the untreated, they both still belong to groups with less than secondary schooling, and it seems implausible that an odd additional year of education would have made the respondent more sensitive to misreport her voting behaviour.
Since the data is restricted to cohorts that were born during 1946-1961, the sample size remains fairly small for an individual level dataset. As explained in Appendix 1, we have a sample of 983 individuals, of which 610 correspond to the "treatment" group that received post-reform education, and 373 to the "control" group of the pre-reform school system.
Model specification for individual level data
An individual level Probit instrumental variable (IV) model of the following form is estimated: The above model is estimated with a sample restricted to those with a maximum of 9 years of education. In addition to estimating the above model, both with and without instrumentation, the Probit model (1) will be estimated for the whole educational distribution for comparison. The highest primary/secondary education type, as described above, is available for all individuals. The data also includes a variable on self-reported years of education, which however suffers from large non-response, but also from unreliability. The sub-sample for which data on years of education is available can be used to produce a model for the "predicted" years of education, by regressing the self-reported years of education on the above schooling category dummies, gender, birth year dummies, and region dummies. Then this model can be applied to the full sample, to produce "predicted" years of schooling for everyone. The details of this exercise are in Appendix 2.
The Years education (predicted), as summarised in Table 2 , point to about one and a half years more of education, than one would expect on the basis of the primary/secondary schooling type 8 .
The predicted years of education will be used only in the regressions for the full sample, the purpose of which is to act as a reference point for the local effects obtained with the instrumental variable estimation.
In addition to voter turnout, the model is estimated for a number of other outcomes: whether the respondent is interested in politics, whether it was easy to decide a candidate, whether the respondent discusses politics, and whether he has taken political action in form of contacting a representative, making a complaint, taking an issue to a political party meeting, writing an opinion piece, demonstrating, or signing a petition.
Results of the individual level analysis
The first stage of the instrumental variables estimation (Equation 2) is reported in Table 3 . Not surprisingly, the reform status has a strong effect on the years of education, and increases it on average by 0.88 years. Table 4 presents the results on the effect of education on voter turnout. The first column uses the predicted years of education to estimate the effect across the whole educational distribution. On average, one year of education is associated with 1.8 percentage points higher probability of voting.
The second column suggests a much larger point effect at the bottom of the educational distribution, but the effect is not statistically significant at any conventional levels. Further, the instrumental variable estimation (IV-Probit) reduces the point estimate to 1.3%, and the effect is not statistically significant either.
Since the instrumental variable is exogenous, one should trust the estimates based on it more, than the non-instrumented estimates. The fact that the non-instrumented Probit estimate at the second column gives a larger coefficient, points to the possibility that unobservable factors, which are correlated with education, bias the estimate upwards.
Overall, Table 4 suggests that firstly, the statistically significant positive effects of education in the full sample (column 1) can not be confirmed, once the sample is restricted to the bottom of the distribution (column 2), possibly due to the smaller sample sizes. Secondly, once the endogeneity of education is addressed in column 3 with instrumental variable estimation, the positive effects look even more remote.
Most years of the Norwegian Election Study also ask the interviewees about other aspects of political activism, in addition to voting. The first three columns of Table 5 list and summarise some of these variables for the subsample of respondents with no more than 9 years of schooling. Further a Probit, and an instrumental variable Probit models are estimated for each of the measures of civic activism.
The results of Table 5 suggest that education in general appears to have no impact on political activism, or interest in politics. The only variable which is statistically significant at 95%
confidence level is the likelihood of signing a petition.
Municipality Level Analysis
This section focuses on the models estimated at the municipality level. The main benefit of this analysis is that the turnout rates can be measured without uncertainty. Secondly, in the presence of behavioural externalities ("I vote because my neighbour votes"), the effects will be captured with aggregate data, but not with individual level data. The main disadvantage will be the lower level of precision that can be expected from an aggregate data.
Regarding the practical implementation of the estimation, the main issue is how to define the instrument at the municipality level so that it can still be argued to be quasi-exogenous. The municipality level analysis allows us to construct a panel data set and utilise the time dimension of the reform. Due to the progression of the reform, different proportions of the electorate had experienced the reformed system in municipalities at a given point in time. In other words, to use the instrument at the municipality level we need to assess how much variation in municipality level educational attainment in our data is due to this reform. The panel data of municipalities consists of the census years 1960, 1970 and 1980 , and the school reform will affect voters in these censuses in the following way:
In census year 1960, none of the cohorts affected by the reform (cohorts 1946-61) were in voting age, and thus all voters were educated in the old school system. 1970, cohorts 1946, 1947, … ,1952 were aged 24, 23, … ,18, and thus eligible to vote. Due to the differential timing of the reform, only some municipalities had voters treated by the school reform in these age groups.
By census year
By the census year 1980, all of the cohorts affected by the reform were in voting age, but again, the proportions of voters affected by the reform are different in different municipalities. All cohorts from 1962 onwards received their schooling in the reformed school system.
Thus the instrumental variable used is the share of voting age population that has gone through the reformed school system (% went to reformed school). Since the reform affects mostly relatively young cohorts until 1980, it is important to control for the municipal age structure when using this instrument.
Whether the treatment intensity, defined as above, remains quasi-exogenous, depends on assumptions we make about the mobility of individuals. Here we make the simplifying assumption that in each census year, individuals received their schooling in the same municipality where they currently live. This corresponds to assuming that the population is not mobile. Since this is a highly restrictive assumption, an alternative definition of the instrumental variable, and alternative set of results, which take into account the mobility of workers, is presented in Appendix 5. These results will be discussed later as a robustness check.
All results presented use a balanced panel data set covering 370 municipalities and three years: 1960, 1970 and 1980 . The data from censuses is aggregated to municipality level using 1980 municipality structure. The definitions of variables and data sources are reported in Appendix 4, and summary statistics for the panel data are presented in Table 6 . The reduction in the number of the municipalities in the final sample, compared to available municipalities, is due to municipality mergers, which make the aggregation of individual level characteristics uncertain for some municipalities, and which are thus left out. The details of the sample formation can be found in Appendix 3.
Model specification for municipal data
The model to be estimated is a municipality level instrumental where T it refers to turnout, i refers to municipality, t to years (t = 1960, 1970, 1980) . Ed it is mean years of schooling in the municipality i at year t. Municipality level control variables are denoted by a vector X it , while f i refers to municipality fixed effect and g t to year dummies. The control variables X it include only controls for the age structure of the municipality. 9 Even though the dependent variable T it is a fraction, it is never close to the boundary values 0 and 1, making an untransformed linear model a sufficiently good approximation. Controlling for municipality fixed effect is important for identification, because it allows us to control for all permanent characteristics of municipalities that may have affected the timing of the reform. As in the individual level analysis, introducing more covariates to predict voter turnout would necessary involve endogenous variables which would not be possible to instrument for. Thus, the model has been kept to its bare minimum.
In the first stage of the instrumental variable estimation (4), the instrument (PT it ) is the proportion of the municipal voting age population that has gone through the reformed school system. The focus of interest is the effect of education on voter turnout, or parameter . The level of education must be measured at municipality level, but is constructed from individual level data.
The municipal level analysis differs from the individual level analysis in two important aspects.
Firstly, the effect of education is measured from the complete educational distribution, not just the bottom, where the reform had its biggest impact. Secondly, the data is from an earlier period -1960 to 1980 -whereas in the individual level analysis the data was from 1977 to 1993. Table 7 , column 1. In column 2, an alternative specification is estimated where county-level 10 linear trends have been added. In the individual level analysis we estimated that the reform increased the years of schooling by 0.88 years, and that this increase applied to the proportion of the population who have at most nine years of schooling. The impact on the rest of the distribution should be close to zero. In this panel data, on average about half of the voters have at most nine years of education. Therefore, we would expect the first stage estimate to be roughly half of 0.88, or 0.44.
Results

The first stage estimate (Equation 4), is presented in
A comparison of columns 1 and 2 in Table 7 suggests that the model where county linear trends are included (column 2) corresponds more to these expectations. The results that follow are nevertheless carried out using both of these specifications. Table 8 presents the results for voter turnout. Overall, there is no positive relation between voter turnout and education whether one uses instrumentation or not, or whether the model is specified with county trends or not. If fact, the estimates for the IV models are negative, and even statistically significant at 95% level in the third column, where county trends are not controlled for.
It is difficult to compare the size of the IV estimates in the municipality level analysis directly with that of the estimates in the individual level analysis, since the latter measured the effect at the bottom of the educational distribution. However, both levels of analysis point to no significant positive effects from education to voter turnout.
Robustness check with an alternative formulation of the instrumental variable
As noted above, the design of the instrumental variable, by construction, assumed that people had received their education in the same municipality as where they currently reside. As an alternative, one can assign the treatment status of the individuals more accurately on the basis of information on their mothers" municipalities of residence in 1960, at the time when the reform took place. Once this individual data is aggregated to municipality level, one can gain more accurate figures for the proportion of the electorate who had received their education in the new school system.
Even if the alternative definition of the instrument leads to potentially better accuracy, the identification of the effects of education on voter turnout can still fail. This is due to the possibility that the treated and non-treated individuals may have become regionally mobile in different ways.
One can still hope that municipality fixed effects and county level trends, once added to the models, will alleviate this possible source of bias.
Appendix 5 reports the alternative set of results. The correlations between the two definitions of the instrument are high (0.99 in 1970 cross section, and 0.84 in 1980, Table A3 ). The conclusions remain largely the same (Tables A4 and A5 . The most notable difference is that the first stage estimation produces somewhat larger than expected effects of the reform on years of schooling (Table A4) , Conclusions
This study has measured the long-term effects of education on voter participation and various measures of political activity. A staged school reform was used as an instrumental variable for years of education. In interpreting the results, it is important to emphasise the context of the reform.
Firstly, while affecting everyone, the reform effectively increased years of schooling only at the bottom of educational distribution. The impact of the reform on the average years of schooling at low levels of attainment was considerable: The segment of the population with lowest qualifications received on average nearly a full year of additional schooling. The strength of the reform as a quasiexogenous source of educational variation is notable compared to earlier studies. Secondly, the reform not only increased the level of education, but imposed a more egalitarian compulsory system, in which the tracking of pupils begins after nine years, instead of seven.
The main result is, that the school reform and the increase in level of education implied by it, did not increase voter turnout. The conclusions can be confirmed at two levels of analysis. At the individual level, survey responses were used to measure the impact of additional years of education resulting from the reform on the voting behaviour of those at the bottom of the educational distribution. At the municipality level, the impact on voting patterns was measured using municipality level panel data with municipality fixed effects.
In relation to voter turnout, the results contribute to the accumulating evidence in which institutional changes are used, such as Milligan et al. (2004) and Siedler (2009) . The results from these studies have not been in full agreement. The findings of this study support the view that political activity of people is driven by other things than education. Notes: Respondent will get value zero for variable "Voted" also if they refuse to answer. (1) The years are counted to be either 7, 8 or 9, if the person reported their highest primary/secondary schooling to be any of these. (2) Predicted years of education is based on a mapping of education categories to self reported years of schooling (see Appendix 2 for details). Notes: Variable "Easy to decide a candidate" is missing from 1993 survey, and "Actions taken" variables are missing from 1977 and 1981 surveys. All models include a female dummy, cohort dummies, survey dummies and region dummies. Reported coefficients are marginal effects of years of schooling. Standard errors are in parentheses and have been corrected for heteroscedasticity. The sample is restricted to those whom the treatment status is defined (less than 9 years of education). Variable "Interested in politics" is coded as 1 if the respondent is "very" or "fairly" interested in politics. "Easy to decide" is coded to 1 if "very" or "fairly" easy to decide. "Discuss politics" is coded as 1 if the respondent discusses politics at least "a couple of times a week". 
Appendix 1 Construction of the sample using Norwegian Election Study data
The Norwegian Election Study is a nationally representative rotating panel carried out every four years by phone, after the parliamentary elections (for documentation, see Kiberg et al. 2000) . The sample used in this study is first restricted only to individuals who are in any of the survey sweeps 1977, 1981, 1985, 1989 or 1993 and are born between 1946-1961 1977, 177 in 1981, 329 in 1985, 412 in 1989 and 744 in 1993 . These individuals are tabulated below by their birth year and type of highest attained primary/secondary education. EdType refers to the type of highest primary/secondary education, as reported by the respondents (see Table A1 ). The results are in the Table A2 below. which the year of school reform is known, based on work by Ness (1971) , and Black et al. (2005) .
For the remaining 67 municipalities the reform was either staged over several years or it is unclear when the reform took place. Secondly, an additional complication arises as a number of municipal mergers took place from 1960 to 1980, reducing the total number of municipalities to 454. Thus in the new municipality structure some municipalities consist of a number of old ones with potentially different years of reform, or undetermined year of reform. In cases like this it has been decided to drop municipalities for which a proportion of the population does not have a well-defined year of reform due to a municipality merger. In cases where a 1980 municipality consists of several former municipalities with different reform years, the share of voters who are reformed can be calculated from individual level data, and individuals can be assigned with the correct treatment status based on their birth cohort and residential status. This procedure leaves us with 370 municipalities.
Increasing the sample size beyond this would compromise the quality of the instrument. 
